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LANI GUINIER, JOSEPH BIDEN, AND THE
VOCATION OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Robert Post*
It is a pleasure to contribute to this tenth anniversary issue
of Constitutional Commentary, which deserves great credit for its
support of free-ranging scholarly reflection, unfenced by the razor wire of bluebook citations. In our profession we have great
need for such spaces of informal dialogue and unconstrained
deliberation.
It is in fact about our profession that I wish to meditate in
this short essay, provoked by the painful and ill-fated nomination
of Lani Guinier. I want to focus on a cavalier but wickedly penetrating remark of Senator Joseph Biden, the chair of the Senate
Judiciary Committee that was to pass on Guinier's candidacy.
After reading Guinier's scholarly articles, Biden said:
If she can come up here and explain herself, convince
people that what she wrote was just a lot of academic musing,
who knows? ... I suppose it's conceivable that she could be
confirmed. If she comes up here and says she believes in the
theories that she sets out in her articles and is going to pursue
them, not a shot.l

Biden's comment candidly questions the social significance of
writing that is avowedly "academic." It invites us to inquire into
the nature of our vocation, to ask for whom and for what purpose we write.
Biden uses the adjective "academic" dismissively, evoking
the genial condescension with which mainstream culture regarded intellectual "eggheads" in the 1950's: Academics are
"theoretical," "out-of-touch," "impractical." Lost in abstraction,
they cannot be entrusted with "real world" tasks. But of course
anyone with any knowledge of Lani Guinier would know that
none of these characterizations could be applied to her. She was
*

Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
1. Neil A. Lewis, Senate Democrats Urge Withdrawal of Rights Nominee, N.Y.
Times, June 2, 1993, at Al (italics added).
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a tough, real-world, hard-driving litigator; she remains an articulate, hard-edged, smart, and persistent scholar.
So Biden more probably meant his use of the word "academic" to apply not to Guinier personally, but to the genre in
which her work appeared. He seems to have meant that law review articles as a form can be dismissed as merely "academic."
We can read Biden as establishing an opposition between the abstract and impractical work of law professors who write for law
reviews, and the real and practical work of Washington officials
who engage in the project of law creation and enforcement.
The question I want to pursue is how we in the legal academy ought to regard this opposition.

***

At first, of course, the answer seems obvious. No self-respecting group of law professors could possibly accept an image
of their work as fumbling and incompetent, relevant only to the
theoretical and useless arcana of the law. But certainly there is at
least one sense in which, I expect, most of us would accept
Biden's opposition. The purpose of legal scholarship is the
achievement of truth, whereas the purpose of the work of Washington officials is governance. And these two purposes, as
Hannah Arendt has had occasion to remind us in terms that
strongly echo Biden's remark, can be deeply oppositional:
The story of the conflict between truth and politics is an
old and complicated one, and nothing would be gained by simplification or moral denunciation. Throughout history, the
truth-seekers and truthtellers have been aware of the risks of
their business; as long as they did not interfere with the course
of the world, they were covered with ridicule, but he who
forced his fellow-citizens to take him seriously by trying to set
them free from falsehood and illusion was in danger of his life:
"If they could lay hands on [such a] man ... they would kill
him," Plato says in the last sentence of the cave allegory.2

Biden covers the law reviews with "ridicule," and by so doing reenacts an ancient tension.
Truth, from the perspective of power, can seem hopelessly
naive and dangerously ingenuous. Power, from the perspective
of truth, can seem irredeemably corrupt and unfounded. Arendt
helps us to see that this tension goes very deep. For truth cannot
remain truth and yield to expediency; truth demands resistance
2. Hannah Arendt, Truth and Politics, in Between Past and Future 227, 229 (Penguin, 1978).
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to the blandishments of this world. And, conversely, governance
cannot yield to truth without losing the forms of interaction that
constitute politics. "[E]very claim in the sphere of human affairs
to an absolute truth, whose validity needs no support from the
side of opinion," Arendt writes, "strikes at the very roots of all
politics and all governments."3 "Seen from the viewpoint of politics, truth has a despotic character."4
One can see the tragic consequences of this opposition
clearly at work in the Lani Guinier case. Scholarly law review
articles are written to reveal the truth of their subject. Academics would consider it a betrayal for an author to alter her conclusions for reasons irrelevant to truth, as for example because of a
desire to be appointed Assistant Attorney General for Civil
Rights. Guinier's articles are thus legitimately read as expressing
her authentic views of truth.
Politicians, however, even when guided at their best by "an
'ethic of responsibility,' "s always speak in ways that are constrained by considerations of role and expediency. It would be
disastrous for them to be subjected to an unconditional "duty of
truthfulness."6 And since Guinier's truth was unacceptable to
the political world of Washington, Biden in effect invited Guinier
to convert her truth into a form of expediency, and to
recharacterize her writings as inauthentically constrained by the
external requirements of academic life. The articles could be rejected as mere "academic musings."
Biden thus set the repudiation of her prior truth as the price
for Guinier's passage from the world of scholarship to the world
of politics. Truth, however, is "despotic," and to Guinier's credit
she found that price to be too high. The barrier between truth
and governance proved impassable.

***

There is, however, more to be learned from the confrontation between Guinier and Biden. We must ask why Guinier's
truth proved to be so very unacceptable to Biden's Senate that
Guinier could not even be given the opportunity to defend it.
Guinier's truth was literally unspeakable in the halls of Congress.
This is curious because the thrust of Guinier's scholarship was to
proffer an interpretation of the legislative intent behind laws en3. Id. at 233.
4. Id. at 241.
5. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 77,
120, 120-27 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., Galaxy, 1958).
6. ld. at 120.

188

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 11:185

acted by that very Congress. Clearly Guinier had got matters
strikingly wrong. Her misapprehension seems so very fundamental as to be incomprehensible in so smart and perceptive a
scholar.
Unless, of course, Guinier was never really concerned with
the prosaic discovery of actual legislative intent at all. In fact the
most plausible interpretation of her controversial articles is that
they were intended to set forth the best possible interpretation of
the Voting Rights Act. The fact that Congress did not and would
not enact the statute Guinier had in mind was to her apparently
irrelevant to the validity of her interpretation. In that sense her
interpretation was utopian; it was truth crying out against history.
The utopian impulse shares with traditional legal scholarship
a hunger for achieving the truth about the social arrangements
that govern us. I was struck by the special nature of this hunger
when I was asked to guest lecture in a graduate seminar offered
by the Berkeley humanities center on "The Historiography of the
Subject." The seminar began by having two graduate students,
one in English and the other in History, comment on my work. I
had submitted articles discussing the legal constitution of the
subject in the tort of invasion of privacy.7 Both graduate students were proficient in the most advanced techniques of cultural
theory. They each remarked that my work contained a great deal
of sociology which they did not feel competent to evaluate. They
each said that they would instead take my articles as themselves
"texts," and they each then proceeded to practice on those texts
the elegant and standard analytic moves of post-modem analysis.
I was astonished. By repudiating the sociology in the articles, the students denied any concern with the "real world" in
which they themselves lived. By flattening the articles into
"texts," they nullified the possibility of arguments for legal reform. Such arguments were no longer to be engaged, but distanced, objectified, and analyzed as examples of discourse. The
methodology practiced by the graduate students thus effectively
erased the question, "How ought we practically to order our
lives?" I realized at that moment how different from the tradition
of cultural criticism was the fundamental pragmatic of my work
as a legal scholar.
Without the matter ever rising to consciousness, I had written the articles guided by the unstated but central problematic of
7. Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 647 (1991); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of
Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 957 (1989).
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clarifying and improving the structures established by law for our
social life. I was concerned to reveal the truth of those structures. To put the matter somewhat paradoxically, I discovered at
that moment that I had been dedicated to uncovering the truth of
political action conducted through the medium of law. The graduate students, in contrast, were concerned to reveal the truth of
discourse, of the possibility of the construction of human meaning from language. The difference between these agendas informed our vastly disparate frameworks of scholarly inquiry and
technique.s
From the perspective of this difference, Guinier's work falls
comfortably within the orientation of ordinary legal scholarship.
Guinier does not read the Voting Rights Act as an objectified
text to be analyzed as discourse, but as a charter for governance.
Her articles seek to reform legal practice, to reveal truths about
how our society ought to be ordered. And yet, in a recent
shrewd and much discussed op-ed piece, Guinier's work was
characterized as "exalting theory over practice,"9 an indictment
no doubt meant to allude to the accumulating charges that legal
scholarship, particularly among "elite" law faculties, has become
unacceptably "impractical" and "abstract. "to
Comparing Guinier's work to that of the graduate students
in the seminar, however, suggests that the opposition between
theory and practice may not be a useful way to capture the most
telling aspects of the confrontation between Guinier and Biden.
At least when compared to our colleagues in the humanities, it is
obvious that Guinier does care very much about practice. Perhaps, then, a better avenue of analysis might be to pursue the
difference between utopian and traditional forms of legal
scholarship.

***
Traditional legal scholarship attempts to establish the meaning of a statute by extrapolating the intent of the legislature
which enacted it. Guinier's controversial work, however, makes
no real effort along these lines. It instead attributes to the Voting
8. For a brief discussion of an emerging style of legal scholarship that is dedicated
to purposes similar to those of cultural theory, see my Legal Scholarship and the Practice
of Law, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 615 (1992). For a prominent example of this alternative form
of legal scholarship, see Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 801 (1991).
9. Mary Ann Glendon, What's Wrong With the Elite Law Schools, Wall St. J., June
8, 1993, at A14.
10. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 35 (1992).
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Rights Act what Guinier frankly considers to be its best possible
meaning.11 This difference of technique is instructive. The
method of traditional legal scholarship strives to maintain a continuity of interest between the legal implementation of statutes
and the political will that enacted them. It does so because it
conceives the truth of legal arrangements ultimately to be
founded on the realistic possibilities of governance, and it is thus
inclined to engage in incremental kinds of reform. Guinier's approach, in contrast, creates a potentially diremptive break between the law and coordinate political institutions. It does so
because it conceives the truth of legal arrangements ultimately to
be founded on the legitimacy of moral vision, and it is thus prepared to use law to pursue radical reconstitutions of society.
These differences, clearly visible in Guinier's methodology,
capture the distinction between utopian and traditional scholarship. The latter conceives law as an art of the possible. It tends to
work within and to tinker at the margins of existing legal institutions. It tends to demonstrate great solicitude for the political
legitimacy of legal institutions and for, in Harlan Stone's words,
the social advantages which accrue from the "continuity and symmetry of the law."1z Utopian legal scholarship, in contrast, tends
to dismiss these virtues as weak and accommodationist. It strives
for a more strenuous kind of law that will directly and uncompromisingly express relevant moral principles and purposes.
Whether its orientation be toward the right or toward the left,
utopian scholarship tends to underplay the independent legitimacy of legal institutions, and to value rectitude more than
precedent.
I mean here to be making a specifically jurisprudential,
rather than political, distinction. The situation would have been
quite different had Guinier framed her analysis as a frank proposal for legislative amendment of the Voting Rights Act. Her
work would then properly be understood as a petition to Congress to alter the law, and Guinier would herself accordingly be
regarded as a citizen advocating political change, albeit an exceptionally informed and concerned citizen. While her articles
might thus have raised issues about the nature of her politics and
her judgment, the question of her legal scholarship would have
been quite secondary.
11. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the
Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1077 (1991).
12. Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 10
(1936).
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Her scholarship became primary, however, because
Guinier's writing, like much published today in the law reviews,
was implicitly addressed to judges. Its premise was that Guinier's
view of the law, as supported and sustained by her legal scholarship, was in fact the law, and that her interpretation of the Voting
Rights Act ought therefore to be implemented by courts. The
distinction between utopian and traditional legal scholarship is
meant to illuminate the difference between two possible settings
for such a claim of legal knowledge.
Understood in this way, it is clear that traditional and utopian legal scholarship differ in matters of degree. Claims to legal
knowledge can be more or less respectful of existing legal institutions; they can propose interpretations that are more or less realistic; they can identify moral principles that are more or less
already immanent within legal institutions. It is instructive in this
regard to contrast the Guinier affair with that of Robert Bork.
Bork's proposed interpretation of the Due Process Clause was
aggressively radical and utopian. Although he was repeatedly
characterized as "out of the mainstream," his views were apparently close enough to provoke a lively debate, the upshot of
which was to relegate Bork's perspective to the periphery of the
national political consensus about the meaning of the Clause.
Guinier's proposed interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, however, was evidently too radical to provoke an analogous debate.
Perhaps because issues of race are so highly explosive and because the margin of publicly acceptable positions is consequently
quite constricted, Guinier's views were dismissed out of hand.
Given the ambient political culture, we might conclude that
Guinier's scholarship was that much more utopian.
All legal scholarship seeks to attain critical distance. All
legal scholarship therefore contains the potential for turning utopian. The danger of traditional scholarship is that it will lose its
critical edge, that the bracketing of fundamental political questions will modulate into a self-satisfied complacency dissipating
any firm sense of moral direction and purpose. The concomitant
strength of utopian scholarship lies in the intensity and clarity of
its moral purposes. But its weakness inheres in its arrogance, in
its potentially despotic desire to impose its own agenda on those
who do not share it. The concomitant strength of traditional
scholarship lies in its humility, in its respect for the political reconciliation of difference and for the values of existing social
institutions.
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This implies, however, that utopian and traditional scholarship are complementary, rather than merely oppositional. Each
supplements and corrects the potential deficiencies .of the other.
Yet it is also true and equally important that the two kinds of
scholarship do not stand on identical footing. In the aftermath of
legal realism we have no choice but to begin from the premise
that law is ultimately an expression of a political will, and it follows from this that utopian scholarship can fulfill its promise of
legal reformation only by radically remaking that political will
through education or otherwise. This has several significant
implications.
It means, first, that utopian scholarship is arduous. It sets
itself the daunting task of fundamentally transforming the general political culture as that culture is expressed in already existing law. Second, utopian scholarship is dangerous because it is
potentially filled with hubris. Its practitioners must be prepared
to set themselves over and against the bulk of their political
peers, and they thus stand in mortal danger of succumbing to the
will to power. Third, to the extent that we have a stable political
culture, utopian scholarship cannot be routinized and can only
seldom be successful. It cannot be the stuff of ordinary, everyday
scholarship.
Taken together, these implications suggest that utopian
scholarship ought not to be undertaken lightly. Borrowing the
language of Bruce Ackerman, we might say that traditional
scholarship is fitting for "normal lawmaking," while utopian
scholarship should be reserved for the far rarer moments of
"higher lawmaking."B The judgment that such an extraordinary
moment is at hand will no doubt be affected by a range of different factors. We can expect, for example, that specific sectors of
the academic community will turn to utopian scholarship as they
feel increasingly oppressed and marginalized by the ambient culture, increasingly distrustful of the opportunities of ordinary politics, and surely such alienation lies at the source of Guinier's own
work.
The law reviews today, however, evidence a very different
phenomenon. The community of legal academics seems to have
turned en masse to higher lawmaking. There is an ever-growing
predominance of utopian scholarship in the law reviews; within
elite schools utopian accents have almost become de rigueur.
The coin of utopian scholarship is concomitantly debased. Instead of a high and serious effort to clarify and reform the pur13. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 6-1 (Belknap Press, 1991).
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poses of law, it has all too often come to seem merely political
petulance masquerading as academic expertise. The searching
resonance of the genre is thus denied to those who are most legitimately pressed to invoke it.

***

In a small way I can perceive the origins of this general turn
toward utopian scholarship in my own teaching. Grading the final examinations in my class on constitutional law last semester, I
realized that for my students there was no gap, no disjunction,
between the Constitution and their own political perspective. As
a committed legal realist, trained to discern, question, and clarify
the political purposes of the law, I had apparently succeeded only
in making the law for my students utterly transparent to their
own political will. I took some comfort in the fact that this influence would surely prove only temporary for the vast majority of
my students who would become practitioners. Practicing lawyers
learn quite quickly not to confuse their own political will with
that of the larger culture, from which law properly springs. For
this reason practicing lawyers experience the law as textured and
resistant, rather than as transparent.
I also realized, however, that there was no obvious mechanism to convey this message to those few of my students fated to
become academics. In fact all our academic assumptions point in
the opposite direction. Legal realism has taught us to see legal
institutions as instruments of policy. We thus see law as always
immanently susceptible to reform on the basis of the best possible policy perspectives, which of course we each strive to articulate. We are therefore drawn to the development and
clarification of the purposes that ought to direct the law. When
we address our resulting analyses to courts, and when we consequently propose our conclusions as characterizations of what the
law is and how it ought to be implemented, we verge toward utopian scholarship. Only rarely and occasionally does a Joseph
Biden come along and remind us, as he did on the occasion of the
nominations of both Guinier and Bork, that law serves the community's purposes, and that these purposes are the prerogative of
common citizenship and not the preserve of academic expertise.
Surprisingly, Biden's rap on the knuckles startled me into a
wholly different picture of law. Instead of seeing law as an instrument of policy, I began to imagine it as an institution situated
in a field of competing policies and purposes. Many of the historical practices of legal institutions, which had before always
seemed to me so obscurantist, suddenly became visible as mecha-
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nisms designed to accommodate and reconcile these political differences, without thereby losing the fact of these differences.
This realization in turn began to cloud the transparency of law,
which now appeared to me clothed with the independent characteristics necessary to achieve this distinctive function. Indeed, I
began to think that legal institutions truly subject to the direction
of a single unitary will would scarcely be recognizable, and that
this was an important meaning of the principle that even the sovereign is subject to the rule of law.
It also occurred to me that this alternative image of the law
has natural affinities with traditional legal scholarship. If legal
institutions are not transparent to political will, understanding
their distinctive function surely can sustain a legitimate academic
expertise. That expertise would have little to do with claims of
special competence in the ascertainment and articulation of the
larger political purposes which ought to be brought to bear on
legal institutions. In fact such claims, if pressed as morally compulsory, might even be suspect, because they are in tension with
the basic function of law to sustain the continued possibility of
political difference.
The clarification and reform of political will would thus
properly be allocated to the competence of the general citizenry,
from which the legal scholar would not be excluded, but as to
which she could not speak with the special prerogatives of expertise. Legal scholarship would ordinarily focus rather more narrowly on the operation of legal institutions, and from this would
follow many of the familiar characteristics of traditional legal
scholarship: a certain incrementalism, a certain conservative respect for the independent value of law, a certain sense of holding
at bay fundamental questions and working instead within a field
of political purposes that are already more or less given.
The contrast with utopian scholarship, while a matter of degree, is nevertheless palpable. As an heir of legal realism, utopian scholarship understands the basic function of law to be the
reflection and accomplishment of political purposes. It thus demands of its adherents engagement precisely with these purposes, and yet it also offers no justification for claiming scholarly
expertise with respect to the ascertainment and advocacy of these
purposes. The upshot is that a misfortune like that which befell
Lani Guinier was simply waiting to happen.
Guinier came to Washington bearing her truths about the
nature of race relations in America and presenting those truths
under the sign of academic expertise. On closer inspection, how-
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ever, that expertise ultimately proved to rest on the kind of political perspective appropriate to the citizen, and so the
prerogatives of the expertise were abruptly dismissed. The resulting shock that ran through the community of legal scholarship could only have been due to our failure adequately to
distinguish between our quest for the truth of legal institutions
and our quest for the truth of political ordering. We had not
quite understood how different was the footing along each of
these paths.
The peremptory dismissal of the substance of Guinier's
truths was also a difficult lesson for the profession. Ensconced in
the narrow world of law reviews, we are apt to forget Arendt's
harsh warning of the tension between truth and politics. We are
apt to confuse our truth with power. We were therefore both
unprepared for and galled by the reminder that in Washington
truth rightly does not command political opinion, even truth
about politics.
Now, in the sober and chastened light of hindsight, we may
perhaps begin to think once again about these and other aspects
of our collective vocation.

